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The syndrome of “overcoming modernity” 
Learning from Japan about ultra-nationalism 
 
 
“Japanese modernity is disorder itself” 
Moroi Saburo (cited in Calichman 2008: 171) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective is to analyse the cultural, social and political conditions of a decisive period of 
Japan’s modernity known by the slogan of “overcoming modernity” (kindai no chokoku). 
This slogan is the title of a colloquium, which took place in Tokyo in July 1942, eight months 
after Pearl Harbour, and associated influential and respected intellectuals. This colloquium 
and slogan signalled a deep and pervasive cultural, political and societal syndrome, conducive 
in the case of Japan to fascism and ultra-nationalism. But this syndrome is not an experience 
unique to Japan. It is observed in every modern society, as a step in its past but also present 
evolution. This syndrome signals therefore an ambiguous and highly dangerous period. It 
expresses the collective experience of a society at a given moment. This experience 
conditions its relation to the past, its understanding of the present and also the capacity of 
individuals and groups to respond to their present situation. This collective experience is 
expressed in metaphysics and inter-subjective bond reinforcing a community under intense 
pressure. In Japan, “overcoming modernity” expressed a deep disenchantment with 
modernization’s effects and sequels, along with deep individual anxiety and collective 
confusion. The case of Japan provides us with  unique knowledge of a major societal 
syndrome. The goal is to construct a theory capable of identifying today similar periods of 
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deep political and cultural instability in nations like China, France, Russia and others, with the 
goal to analyse these cases and evaluate the resulting risks and potential responses. 
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Ultra-nationalism: a complex cultural and social construction 
 
The objective is to add a wider perspective to a critical and well-studied moment of 
Japanese modernity, known by the slogan of “overcoming modernity” (kindai no chokoku). 
This slogan was formulated in the early 1940s. It signalled a deep and pervasive cultural, 
political and societal syndrome, which shaped and intensified Japanese ultra-nationalism, 
which brought legitimacy to a totalitarian regime and justified a total war, which could not be 
won. It is a typical case of self-fulfilling prophecy: the Japanese had to unify under their 
Emperor in order to remain a free nation and Japan was in the end defeated and colonized. 
Paradoxically this defeat is supposed to have freed the Japanese people from this historical 
period, and its metaphysics and politics2.  
This slogan points to a specific historical moment: extreme political and economic 
constraints had given birth to an overwhelming cultural issue: to overcome modernity, this 
modern world, which has invaded and overwhelmed the Japanese nation since its opening in 
the last seven years, since the second half of the 19th century. The problem was not to restore 
a vanishing traditional society. But where is this new overcoming leading Japan? Is this 
cultural movement a criticism of Meiji modernizers, of their conception of modernity? The 
moment, the syndrome and its slogan are not unique to Japan. On the contrary, they are found 
in every modern society and they seem to constitute a step in its own evolution. This 
syndrome expresses the collective memory of a society at a given moment. It conditions the 
relationship of this society to its past, the understanding of the present  and the capacity of 
individuals and groups to be actors responding to their present situation. But this collective 
memory is both a subjective experience and inter-subjective bond reinforcing a community 
under extreme stress. In Japan, “overcoming modernity” expressed a deep disenchantment 
with modernization’s effects and sequels, deep individual anxiety, collective confusion and 
even despair. Expressionism was the name given in Germany to a similar ambiguous 
                                                
2 Thank you to Glenn Hook for having reread a former version. 
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experience, which took shape in the early 1910s, was reinforced in the 1920s and was 
absorbed in the 1930s by the Nazi party, Nazi ideology and its policies 3 . Japanese 
intellectuals learned in Germany how to articulate in literature and poetry, philosophy and 
cinema, the experience, which in their own context was transforming their collective memory. 
In the 1930s and early 1940s, a French type of fascism was also a version of the “overcoming 
modernity” syndrome and, like in Japan, this virus did not vanish (Sternhell 2012). 
 
It is short sighted to reject the project of “overcoming modernity” in the past: indeed, 
it remains as a project faced today in different parts of the world. The slogan expresses a 
psychosocial experience reflecting  a specific historical conjuncture. It seems to emerge when 
the cycle of modernization in a society is reaching its end; when its projection in the future 
and its promises are contradicted by daily life; when people open their eyes and minds to the 
reality of modernization; when they realize what a modernized society really is, what it 
brought about and, having lost all  hope, what they must live with heretofore. Furthermore, 
“overcoming modernity” expresses how individuals and groups experience a systemic crisis. 
It reveals how a systemic crisis is concretely transforming their collective life and individual 
subjectivities as well as how they try to react and respond to such a crisis. It is precisely the 
moment when societies become fragile, unstable and their evolution unpredictable.  
In this way, “overcoming modernity” represents also a typical syndrome of 
contemporary societies, not only in Europe, in contemporary France and Japan but elsewhere, 
too, in China and Russia. The experience of  “overcoming modernity” was historically the 
source of extreme right-wing ideologies. But extreme cases dissimulate the pervasiveness of a 
complex psychosocial process. In these periods, opposite ideologies converge into a meta-
ideology, which permeates individuals and groups in society beyond contradictory or opposite 
beliefs and ideologies. That is, “overcoming modernity” goes beyond the modern opposition 
between Left and  Right. It is manifest as a sort of metaphysic, or mythology, all at once 
cultural, social, political and economic 4 . This meta-ideology is considered to explain 
everything. It is not falsified by events and is constantly adapted to respond to challenges or 
oppositions, to criticism from knowledge established by human and social sciences. It 
articulates from inside personal and collective memory (Halbwachs 1952 & 1992, Le Goff 
1988). It functions as modern society’s mythology. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan 
                                                
3 For the psychosocial context of emergence of the Nazi ideology and related policies, see (for instance) Otto 
Friedrich 1972: chapters XIII to XVII, and Wilhelm Reich 1933. 
4 The formation of a meta-ideology is rare but not uncommon. Another case of meta-ideology is the neoliberal 
paradigm, which emerged in the second half of the 1970s and remains dominant today. 
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called this modern mythology the “Imaginary” in order to explain what people is situation of 
stress consider “real”, their reality, the common world as given, lived and explained to them. 
 
Finally the syndrome of “overcoming modernity” combines memory with history. 
Memory refers to an individual and collective subjectivity: it is made of narratives, 
discourses, private and shared experiences in the back of everybody’s mind, reactivated and 
reinterpreted in the course of daily life. Because it is both private and collective, memory is 
never homogeneous or unified but always fluid, ambiguous and multiple. Memory is inter-
subjective showing patterns source of various philosophical elaborations developing a 
phenomenology of an experience common to individuals and groups during a certain period 
of time. One of these elaborations is the construction of narratives expressing a common 
history making sense and organizing collective memories into a common memory. We all are 
immersed in a collective memory with its narratives and anecdotes making our common 
history. This is what we have in common, how we communicate: it constitutes the “social 
networks”, which are the fabric of our everyday life and trans-individual identity.  
But in the evolution of societies, history took also another sense and dimension. If the 
first sense, history means an immersive subjectivity, this new sense supposes a discontinuity 
and even creates a distance from collective memory and subjectivity. This new cognitive 
attitude emerges in the course of the so-called “modernization” process as result of disruptive 
events or catastrophes. This new attitude does not annihilate collective subjectivity, memory 
and history. But it brings in a different perspective; it operates a growing distantiation, it 
opens a different relation to society, like the beginning or possibility of a new epoch. This 
different conception of history brings into the open and criticizes the presuppositions of 
existing historical narratives, illusions of collective subjectivities and related ideologies, 
including their political consequences. The transformation of collective memory into this new 
history is a social and political construction typical of modern societies, i.e. societies 
characterized by the formation of human and social sciences. These disciplines constantly 
introduce within these societies a critical distance, which are transforming them, making them 
change and progress. This evolution makes possible a completely different conception and 
practice of philosophy. Shifting from collective memory to history as human science remains 
a constant tension and unfinished struggle. 
 
 
  
5 
1. Japan’s modernization and its discontents 
 
In Japan, this “overcoming modernity” process started in the 1930s and it receded by 
the late 1940s when the “second modernization” opened by the reconstruction of the wartime 
devastation was superseding this experience. But this experience remained a repressed 
memory, one that was reactivated in the late 1980s when Japan’s economy, society and 
culture glided into another systemic crisis, which lasts until today. The experience has been 
extremely well studied by Japanese researchers (Takeuchi see Calichman 2005, Kato 2010, 
Tsurumi 2013, See Olson (1992) for an overview) and by specialists of Japan (Doak 1994, 
2007; Harootunian 2000; Calichman 2004, 2008; Harootunian & Miyoshi 1989), who have 
been studying in the early 1990s the similarities between post-modernism and the idea of 
overcoming modernity. Their work provides us with a deep understanding of this key moment 
in Japanese history and by extension of similar social, political and cultural movements 
identified in European history as fascism. Even if Japan’s ultra-nationalism of the late 1930s 
and 1940s was an extreme form of fascism, greatly influenced by German philosophy, these 
studies of Japan have built up our  knowledge of this historical moment as far richer than the 
notions of nationalism, fascism and Nazism. Indeed, the work as a whole helps to identify and 
explain similar historical moments in different societies, in the past, present and even the 
future7. In each modernising society, a collective experience of “overcoming modernity” 
seems to take shape as an overwhelming social, cultural and political issue. Harry 
Harootunian (2000) explained that in the case of Japan it is both a collective experience of 
being overcome by modernity and the urge to overcome modernity as a response to this 
collective anxiety.  
It is the subjective experience of an estranged society shared by a whole community, 
of past or recent evolutions, which have disrupted or distorted an established order or 
continuous path. This experience is a sense of loss felt intimately by individual subjects, with 
intense anxiety about the present and future of their community. In these moments, society 
has lost the imagined ground, the frame of its history, and the grand narratives at the core of 
its identity. Individual subjectivities feel they lost what binds them into a community within a 
social system. For memory is always private as well as collective: it touches the relationship 
of an individual to itself, its sense of identity, as well as its relationship with the others built in 
                                                
7 For instance, in China, the present cultural debate about the opposition between “true” Chinese culture and 
western influences is typically a case of the syndrome of “overcoming modernity”. This cultural debate 
expresses and dissimulates at the same time a major political struggle with major consequences.  
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her or his identity 8 . The imagined collective memory holding a community together is 
fractured and this fracture needs to be repressed. Having lost the frame and the map holding 
the puzzle together, its fragments gravitate in search of other attractors. 
This psychosocial instability is expressed in the Japanese experience of tenkō (turn 
around, reversal, swift shift). A recurrent feature in Japanese history, tenkō is often 
understood as a negative cultural feature (deceit, lack of trust, etc.) or as personal weakness, 
reduced to a change of mind, when it is in fact the result of strong pressure on individuals, 
groups and society, in essence, the outcome of a power struggle. It was clearly defined by 
Takeuchi Yoshimi in 1959: “Conversion may resemble tenkō on the outside, but its direction 
is the reverse. If tenkō is a movement toward the outside, conversion is a movement toward 
the inside. Conversion takes place by preserving the self, whereas tenkō occurs by abandoning 
the self9” (cited in Calichman 2005: 75). When societies are losing their established subjective 
frames and become unstable, when individuals feel they are losing their self, tenkō is 
activated. 
 
But this sense of personal loss and collective anxiety were not a spontaneous 
experience. They were constructed by groups specialized in expressing, shaping and 
communicating the collective experience. These individuals took as their social duty and 
cultural responsibility to express and explain to the people what people were supposed to feel 
as well as what they should do about it. These groups are commonly called intellectuals not in 
the French sense but in the sense of intelli, a Japanese abbreviation from the Russian 
intelligentsia (Sartre 1965, Maruyama 1982, Bourdieu 1992, Rieu 1999, 2001). This Japanese 
intelligentsia associated individuals from different social origins and interests who had in 
common a specialization in modern knowledge, the knowledge required for the formation and 
management of a modern nation. But these intelli did not share the same conception of a 
modern Japan. Because of their diverse social origin, most of them never achieved the 
positions they expected in the Meiji State apparatus (appareil d’Etat, Althusser 1970).  
They were the discontents of modern Japan 11 , highly frustrated over not being 
recognized for their competence and resentful of this modern society, which did not offer 
them the responsibility and position they thought their due. They felt rejected by the Meiji 
                                                
8 This problem defies the demarcations within the humanities and social sciences between private and public, 
between psychology, sociology, economics and politics. At their best, Japanese studies constantly step beyond 
these demarcations. 
9 Calichman (2004) p 75.  
11 Michael Wert uses the expression “Meiji restoration losers” (Wert 2013). 
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state and marginalised in the new economy and social ordering. Yet, these discontents never 
identified themselves with the people, or with the various entrepreneurs, opportunists and new 
rich of modern Japan. At the same time, they never formed a unified group; they were and 
remained in between the classes, torn between their social origin, their acquired knowledge, 
their expectations and the reality of Meiji Japan, waiting for an opportunity and a role to 
play12. Their discontentment made them highly receptive to tenkō. They were and remained 
strongly divided between those who accepted positions in the modern State apparatus, in its 
new academic institutions and its economy, and those who refused to participate or were 
marginalized because of their conception of culture, their criticism of the political and 
economic regime or because of their social origin. But both groups shared the common ideal 
of national sovereignty embodied in the tennō (emperor). For all these reasons, they did not 
constitute an effective opposition to those in power. But they did not trust them. Without 
political power, they accumulated resentment and frustration, leading to despair and revenge, 
expecting their time to come. So the tenkō did not concern the goals and ideals of 
modernization: securing Japan’s sovereignty understood as Japan’s uniqueness. 
Modernization was not conceived as an end in itself but as a project for reaching a spiritual 
goal or transcendental ideal. Tenkō operated at a lower level, the level of the means to be 
selected in the pursuit of a larger goal.  
The two main groups of discontents were divided between those who on the one hand 
wished to modernize Japan’s state, economy, society, culture, including art and religion, and 
those on the other hand who, without opposing modernization, wished to reinterpret and 
preserve what made in their view Japan unique, its conception of human bonds, of culture and 
spirituality. A large proportion of both groups found refuge in art, literature and poetry, 
history, philosophy or science. The first group was fascinated by foreign philosophy, new 
literature, world history and modern science. The other group intended to protect or save 
Japanese conceptions of literature, poetry, philosophy and spirituality by reinterpreting them, 
by expressing them with different means. Modern science seemed to them a conception of 
knowledge based on a relationship between humanity and nature foreign to Japanese 
experience. But foreign technology was reduced to no more than means and machines, 
instruments and tools, which could be imported as long as they did not thwart the Japanese 
                                                
12 I am deeply influenced here by Japanese literature, mainly by Natsume Soseki, in particular by Nowaki (1908, 
in French Rafales d’automne, 2015) but also And then (1909) and his essay “Japanese modern civilisation” 
(Natsume 1911). See Rieu (2001: 165-190, 2013: 4.4). In Nowaki, the main character, Shirai Dôya, expresses the 
most explicit and violent criticism against the new leading class of entrepreneurs and against those who succumb 
to their values. Reading this novel is to wonder what Shirai Dôya would have thought in 1942. 
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spirit and become an end in itself13. Some of these intellectuals were cultural celebrities. 
However socially divided, these two groups had for common interest the hope and even the 
will to modernize Japan in order to save its distinctive culture. The ambiguous hope to 
modernize and save at the same time, the will to dedicate their life to achieve this goal, were 
common to all of them.  
 
These different groups, their different experiences and common beliefs collided at the 
end of the 1930s. The slogan overcoming modernity is the syndrome of this aggregation, 
which wrapped the whole of Japanese society in a powerful ideology. This was the explicit 
theme of the “infamous colloquium”, which took place in Tokyo on 23-24 July 1942, just 
eight months after Pearl Harbour, the US declaration of war and the full immersion of Japan 
into the second world war, which ended with Japan’s catastrophic self-destruction, 
Hiroshima, unconditional surrender and military occupation. Even if what happened was not 
anticipated, the state of mind of the Japanese people in July 1942 when they thought about 
their individual and collective situation, can be imagined. Similar debates were many at the 
time, most of them closer to official propaganda (Calichman 2008: xi-xii). The slogan 
overcoming modernity expresses therefore a precise historical moment in the long-term 
evolution called “modernization”.  
 
Our motive for putting this moment in perspective is to examine if it belongs 
specifically to Japan’s modern evolution or if it indicates a specific moment within the 
modernization process of all or most societies, a social and cultural response to modernization 
processes transforming in depth economies, societies, belief systems and cultures. The 
syndrome “overcoming modernity” is the memory of a moment, which erupted within Japan’s 
modernization process. It is also  a response to this experience in order to repress this memory 
or overcome this disruption. What is this experience? It is not a repetition of forgotten 
souvenirs, a nostalgia for a previous state, but rather a repetition of successive disruptions, 
which transformed Japan from the mid-nineteenth century: the intrusive foreigners, the civil 
wars, the restoration of the Emperor, the invention of a Nation-state and its institutions; the 
economy and the working conditions of society, new mentalities, cultures and cities; the 
propaganda of the Meiji state, the wars with Korea, China and Russia; the cultural, economic 
                                                
13 Encapsulated in the slogan wakon yōsai (Japanese spirit/foreign techniques) and other oppositions. These 
oppositions constitute the long-term “symbolic structure of Japan’s modernisation”, (Rieu 2001: 63-71 2013: 65-
72).  
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and social loosening as well as the increased political control of late Taishō era; the long-term 
economic depression of the late 1910s and the failure of government to find solutions; the 
Great Kanto earthquake of 1923, the growing social disorder and political violence from the 
early 1930s onwards; the state of war since the mid-1930s and the increasing political and 
economic control of society. Individual and collective experience was the violent repetition of 
disruptions. This memory was a source of intense anxiety. There was nothing to remember, 
just disruption, disorder and anxiety. 
 
The formation of this syndrome raises another problem: has this moment happened 
only once, in Japan’s evolution? When and under which circumstances can this syndrome 
occur again? Because of the dramatic context of its occurrence in Japan, it is important to 
evaluate if its repetition in the modernization of other societies is proof of a similar context or 
if it can lead to similar consequences. In this case, as in many others, Japan should be 
considered, according to Kamisatō Tetsuhiro’s expression, “the canary of modernity” (2012). 
If it is the case, then “overcoming modernity” is indeed a syndrome of a singular and 
dangerous moment in the modernization of all societies. This should be of concern. The only 
way to answer such a question is to study the colloquium itself in order to understand how the 
syndrome is constituted, to identify and articulate together its main themes as expressed in 
this colloquium, then to excavate the memory of this colloquium, the repetition of this 
experience and its successive interpretations. From this perspective, studying the “infamous 
colloquium” means far more than academic work. The task belongs to the event itself: for it 
participates in its own repetition or, hopefully, its non-repetition. 
 
2. Converging ideologies 
 
This sociological convergence does not explain the cultural dynamics of “overcoming 
modernity”, nor how this collective disenchantment and deep-felt anxiety were formulated 
into a set of arguments formulating a powerful collective experience and its ideological 
holding power. Less than a year after Japan’s full immersion in Word War II, already at war 
with its neighbours in East Asia since the 1931 Manchurian incident, a group of intellectuals 
decided to meet in Tokyo in order to discuss the role of Japan in world history, i.e. the 
meaning of this total war for Japan as a nation and for the Japanese people, the responsibility 
of intellectuals toward the war, the nation and the people of Japan. The colloquium was 
carefully organized, well researched and its findings amply communicated. With few 
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exceptions, the participants prepared their papers in advance and circulated them among 
themselves. The colloquium consisted of two days of discussion  based on a list of subjects 
selected from the papers (Calichman 2008: XII). The organizers 16  were members of a 
respected magazine, the Bungakkai (Literary World). They had planned in advance to publish 
the papers and the debates in their magazine. The theme “overcoming modernity” was 
therefore systemically explored and debated from different perspectives. 
This explains why the colloquium remains today such a disturbing and important 
event, as well as why the contents of the colloquium can be interpreted as a syndrome of the 
psychosocial state of a society. While the participants did not invent the slogan, “overcoming 
modernization,” they did explore its different aspects and constructed the syndrome. 
Understanding the cultural roots of  these intellectuals and their understanding of  
“overcoming modernization,” assumes importance due to their role in expressing the tacit 
thought of the Japanese people, their fears of and anxieties about the  war, in which all, one 
way or another, were involved. Indeed, this is the reason why these intellectuals had in the 
first place decided to participate in a colloquium on this topic; that is, they saw themselves as 
a substitute for the people and ascribed to themselves a major cultural and political 
responsibility: to construct an explanation making sense of the war for the people of Japan.  
The syndrome of “overcoming modernity” was a collective construction based on the 
convergence of two interpretive matrices and discursive attractors shaping collective 
experience, establishing their holding power on Japanese social, cultural and political history 
in state of tenkō. These interpretive frames have a long history, a deep cultural and political 
weight. They still inhabit present-day discussions. They do not constitute a rigid ideology but 
an open debate revolving around key ideas about Japan’s present situation, its causes and the 
consequences to avoid at any cost. This explains why these ideas cut across usual distinctions 
and political oppositions. Even if rooted in popular culture and the media, it is inappropriate 
to view these interpretive frames as implicit, non conscious, because they were explicitly 
formulated, conceptualized and debated by two institutionalized schools of thought, the Kyoto 
school and the Japanese romantic school. Based on Japanese studies, my goal is to define 
these two interpretive matrices, as manifest in the early 1940s and as still active today.  
 
 Three members of the famous Kyoto school, Nishitani Keiji, Suzuki Shigetaka and 
Shimomura Torataro expressed the first interpretive frame. They had in common their role as 
                                                
16 Kamei, Kawakani, Kobayashi, Nakamura, Miyoshi, Hayashi. 
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university professors and a shared  ambition of creating the first genuinely Japanese school of 
modern philosophy. Two were specialists in German romantic philosophy. They identified 
philosophy with the formulation and interpretation of the core values of a nation, the template 
of its culture, institutions and historical evolution. These core values were considered the 
“spirit” of the nation, its distinctive trans-historical and transcendental identity. These 
Japanese philosophers intended to express in this German philosophical matrix the distinctive 
values and cultural heritage of the Japanese nation. These they found in Zen Buddhism as 
they considered Christianity the distinctive source of all Western societies. This is what 
China’s leadership is doing with New Confucianism. 
Zen Buddhism is quite different from its usual Western conception. Buddhism arrived 
in Japan in the twelfth century but was thoroughly reinvented in the late nineteenth century. In 
a seminal article (1993), Robert Sharf explained how the Buddhist communities tried to 
reinvent themselves after having been censured and persecuted by Meiji reformers as “a 
corrupt, decadent, antisocial, parasitic, and superstitious creed, inimical to Japan's need for 
scientific and technological advancement”17. Some of the Buddhist leaders who had been 
trained in universities sought to restore their religion and reform it thoroughly in line with the  
new modern standards found in German philosophy, in the tradition of Schleiermacher, 
Nietzsche, Dilthey and later Heidegger. In this way, “New Buddhism” was intended to be a 
rediscovery and a return to true Buddhism, purified of old superstitions and thoroughly 
compatible with modern science and technology. To prove compatible with modern Japan, in 
response also to Shintoism transformed into official state religion, these leaders  integrated 
the values and goals of the Meiji government, in particular the conception of the kokutai 
(national polity, Nishida 1944) ideology establishing the transcendental (trans-historical) 
homogeneity and spirituality of Japanese nation under its emperor18. This modern Buddhism 
strongly contributed to the Meiji government’s effort to establish Japan as a world power: 
Buddhism was becoming a world religion spreading Japan’s spiritual values19. It quickly 
played a major role in the diffusion and legitimation of Japanese nationalism in its most 
extreme forms by integrating a key element from the Confucian tradition, namely, “one’s 
                                                
17 My comments draw also on Shields (2011), mainly chapter 1: “Buddhism, criticism and post-war Japan”. 
18 The kokutai is a pre-modern conception of Japan’s sovereignty elaborated during the Edo period. According 
to this mystical ground of the Japanese nation, all subjects are unified as one body in a global biophysical and 
spiritual entity incarnated by the emperor. Various intellectuals associated to the Kyoto school further elaborated 
the kokutai ideology in the late 1930s. 
19 The main objective of Robert Sharf’s article is to explain how this propaganda created the conception of Zen 
still prevalent today around the world. 
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master cannot be criticized” (Victoria 2014)20 . New Buddhism thus added a totalitarian 
component absent in Meiji authoritarianism. This religion was reconstructed according to a 
political model and agenda: it became part of the State apparatus and later of the war strategy. 
Certainly, other Buddhist movements were reformed or founded in Japan’s modern and 
contemporary history,21 but none played such a radical role as Zen Buddhism. 
In summary, Buddhist reformers did to their religion what Meiji reformers did to the 
Japanese State, economy and society, that is, replicated the project and its ideology. But the 
second generation of the reborn Zen Buddhists from the Kyoto School were fully trained and 
highly competent university professors. Their goal was to create a distinctive national 
philosophy expressing and teaching Japan’s spiritual values. Traditional Zen Buddhism was 
not a philosophy: it was based on spiritual exercises in search of enlightenment withdrawn 
from society and considered a direct understanding of the Buddha. In modern Japan, spiritual 
practice had become a reflexive philosophical discourse to access being, i.e. a purely Japanese 
experience of being (Japanese), the “spirit” of all things Japanese, purified from foreign 
influence. This conception of philosophy went beyond the distinction between philosophy, in 
the Socratic and modern sense22, and wisdom or religion23. Heidegger was considered to be 
the most influential living German philosopher because he explained the need for our 
industrial societies to return to a primary experience purified from historical interpretations. 
At the same time, his work pointed the way to rediscover this ancient quest and achieve this 
experience. Zen Buddhism was considered an alternative, properly Japanese, to access the 
experience of truth and being and also an alternative to Christianity: the experience of Zen 
Buddhist “nothingness” was supposed to be more radical, authentic and spiritual than the 
Christian God with its complicated structure (revelation, trinity, etc.) and theology (Tanabe 
1947, Heisig 2002). 
This interpretation of Buddhism at the same time functioned as a criticism of all 
foreign metaphysics, which distracted the Japanese people and culture from a true Japanese 
experience of being. But first of all such interpretation was a political experience and theory. 
                                                
20 These two articles explain how the influence of Zen Buddhism spread in Europe and the USA.  
21 It is still part of Japanese contemporary political life. For instance, the New Komeito founded in 1998, is 
playing a key role in establishing political majorities. After having been associated with The Democratic Party of 
Japan, it has shared power since the December 2012 election as the junior partner in the coalition with the 
Liberal Democratic Party. This party is an historical outgrowth of a powerful and highly controversial Buddhist 
sect founded in 1930, the Soka Gakkai. It is a case of a religious movement, which has become a (normal) 
political party.  
22 Nietzsche had a strong influence on this group, mainly through Heidegger’s interpretation of his work.  
23 This is the reason why it is considered post-modern by some Japanese intellectuals or philosophers. Ethics is 
supposed to overcome the modern divide between philosophy and religion. It is also frequent in the West, 
mainly in neo-conservative movements. 
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A philosophical matrix always contains within it a full memory of problems to be raised and 
solutions to be found. Concerning this conception of a spiritual truth, German romantic 
philosophy underscored how the transcendental experience of being was always expressed not 
only within a religion or a society but also within an historical community and political entity. 
This experience of being is the spirit of a nation, a civilization, a religion or humanity itself. 
The Zen experience of being was the experience of the spirit of the Japanese nation embodied 
in the tennô, the emperor. Nishida Kitaro not only explained this philosophy but also turned it 
into an extreme nationalist ideology (Nishida 1943, 1944, Dilworth D. and Viglielmo V. 
1998, Lavelle 1994). One of his disciples, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), explained after the 
war that this experience of being found its final meaning in a conception of a personal and 
collective ethics, an attitude toward humanity, nature and the world.  
In 1944, in one of his last writings, “Kokutai” (On the national polity), Nishida Kitaro 
himself underwent a remarkable tenkō: announcing a probable defeat in the war, he explained 
that a philosophical mistake had been made. After having condemned racist (German) 
nationalism, he then condemned ethnic (Japanese) nationalism. The error was the project to 
liberate Asia by military force and, because of this mistake, Japan had become an imperialist 
nation like the others. In essence, Japan had committed two fatal errors: on one hand, it 
betrayed its imagined spiritual mission and on the other it misunderstood the true sense of 
world history. To secure its survival, it imitated the behaviour as its enemies instead of 
cultivating its historical identity. This was supposed to explain why Japan found itself in a 
battle it could not win.  
Yet, this does not mean Nishida was renouncing ultra-nationalism. On the contrary, 
ultra-nationalism was not radical enough, not spiritual enough: war should be overcome to 
achieve peace as truly spiritual. Worse even, war and defeat were considered a purifying 
experience to free Japan from all militaristic and imperialist temptations, which proved a 
betrayal of Japan’s true spirit and historical meaning. So post-war Japan was officially anti-
militarist, humanistic and pacifist. These are not left-wing ideas, but were rather viewed as 
representing a common ideal beyond the Left-Right divide. Japan’s pacifism is a version of its 
trans-historical uniqueness (Almog 2014). In other words, pacifism is the pursuit of war by 
spiritual means. 
 
The second interpretive frame and conceptual attractor was the Japanese romantic 
school. Its two participants at the colloquium, Kamei Katsuichiro and Hayashi Fusao, were 
not “philosophers” belonging to academic institutions but rather, like the organizers, writers, 
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poets, journalists, essayists and literary critics in the modern media. They can be considered 
progressive, the Left. They shared  a different relationship to Japan’s cultural memory, social 
positioning and political agenda. They were influential intellectuals who had belonged to the 
Movement for a proletarian literature. “Proletarian literature” had less to do with a Marxist 
conception of the proletariat than with modern literature and the description of the people in 
their daily life in essays, short stories and novels. This conception of modern literature was 
imported from Europe and Russia: in essence, it meant Baudelaire, Dickens, Zola and 
Dostoevsky, the streets and underworld of London, Paris or Saint Petersburg. This literature 
was modern because it offered new narrative models making a place for the daily and inner 
life of ordinary people, their search for explanations and values in order to make sense of their 
lives in a society which had transformed the way people worked and behaved toward each 
other, the relations within the family, between men, women and children, their feelings, ideals 
and desires, including their political regime. Literature was connecting individual and 
collective memories. In a sense, the people had invaded literature, all classes together and the 
real people as a new nation, shouldering the problems of misery, oppression and frustration. 
This invasion had a strong political meaning. Modern literature and Marxism had given shape 
to this new collective experience, the first one was expressing distress without hope and the 
second one was explaining this distress and providing hope: the unity of a people overcoming 
and transcending a modern and foreign model of society.  
Around 1910, after the Kotoku Sushui incident 26 , Marxism was considered a 
dangerous foreign doctrine and was soon forbidden. The intellectuals concerned by The 
movement for a proletarian literature slowly converted to the romantic school and its German 
conception of a cultural and historical community. These intellectuals had in common with 
the followers of the Kyoto school a certainty: what turns a community into a nation is deeper 
than institutions, no matter traditional or modern. Their tenkō was ambiguous: it meant both a 
rejection of Western imperialism and the emancipation of the Japanese people, both a search 
for a principle to resist foreign oppression and for a principle to unite the people. 
Emancipation ideals and nationalism remain until today in a state of profound confusion. 
Political consciousness and literary interests were merging in the new media of the time and 
this ambiguous relationship was shaping their public.  
                                                
26 The “Kotoku Sushui incident” is an aborted anarchist attempt against the Emperor Meiji, which gave the 
police the opportunity to arrest various anarchists and socialists and hang some of them without real trial. It sent 
a strong message throughout Japanese society: the time of repression had started. Kotoku Sushui was a writer 
and journalist, pacifist and internationalist, socialist and anarchist. 
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A participant in the colloquium, Moroi Saburo, a musician and musicologist trained in 
Germany, formulated the meaning of romanticism at this moment of Japanese culture. It was 
a literary conversion, a redemption and solution to all modern problems: “For romanticism, 
the highest art expresses the moment when the whole is known by the individual, whereupon 
individuality bursts into flames and sets up sparks” (Calichman 2008:165). Flames and sparks 
are the signs of the spirit, with dreadful overtones. This romantic conversion was a type of 
tenkō. Romanticism is the overcoming of individual subjectivity and access to the whole, to 
the community as a whole. The nation was sacred and in the case of Japan this sacred 
principle of unity was, as old as Japan, the tennō. But the core and principle of this 
community was the living emperor, the embodied spirit of a Japanese identity adverse to 
capitalism. Communism and nationalism, anti-capitalism and anti-modernization were mixed 
up in a sort of emancipatory nationalism. 
 
 The organizers included also individuals typical of modernized Japan: a catholic 
theologian, disciple of Jacques Maritain; a scientist specialized in contemporary physics; a 
film critic and the music composer, Moroi Saburo (Calichman 2008: 164-176).28 They were 
highly specialized individuals associated in a project beyond their real field of expertise. Even 
if each of them had enjoyed real experience and a deep understanding of European history, 
their contribution to this colloquium and its broad subject induced them to reproduce the same 
concepts (“essence”, “spirit”, “identity”, “unity”) as the two conceptual matrices.  
 
3. “Overcoming modernity”: meta-ideology as metaphysics 
 
What is “infamous” about this colloquium is the convergence of these two discursive 
frames. This convergence was performed and reinforced by respected intellectuals giving 
themselves for goal to reinterpret the past and to construct a collective memory within 
individual subjectivities. This convergence was achieved by a dramatic tenkō into the 
common matrix of Japanese ultra-nationalism. Of course, this convergence did not invent 
Japan’s ultra-nationalism: its doctrine and conditions were already in place.  The proceedings 
of the colloquium were not so widely read that they intensified ultra-nationalistic hold on the 
population. Probably, many Japanese, perhaps most of them, never accepted the most extreme 
aspects of this form of fascism. The point is rather that “overcoming modernity” gave a 
                                                
28 His contribution, “From our standpoint. Reflexions on overcoming modernity”, is of particular interest for its 
clarity, his real knowledge of European cultural history and his views on the state of Japan. 
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slogan and content to a syndrome. It exhibited a process aggregating individual subjectivities 
and collective attitudes, anchoring them firmly in a discourse as well as a vision of the 
Japanese nation and the role of each Japanese in the present situation. Certainly, people were 
more than ready to assimilate these ideas and thought processes, which heretofore had not yet 
been formulated in such a synthetic, explicit and well-argued manner. The reputation and 
quality of the participants in the colloquium  reinforced the absorption of these ideas and their 
retention by the masses. An analysis of this colloquium can therefore be viewed as an analysis 
of Japanese individual and collective subjectivities at this historical conjuncture. 
By repeated tenkō, the search for spiritual truth and the search for political and 
economic emancipation merged into a new discourse: collective emancipation was found in 
the cult of the emperor by means of total war in order to protect the Japanese people from the 
evils of modern society and foreign imperialism, with the goal of saving Japan’s unique trans-
historical identity. What is infamous in this colloquium is that this ideological, even 
philosophical, convergence operated in such a way as to eliminate any alternative discourses. 
Many Japanese intellectuals never accepted this discursive domination. Their voices 
were silenced and their conceptual references marginalized and repressed. Being dispossessed 
of an alternative narrative and memory, they were reduced to reproducing this self-same tenkō 
or  withdrawing from intellectual life (Cassegard 2008), that is, they had to keep silent and 
obey. They had no voice, because they did not possess a conceptual frame to voice alternative 
ideas. Infamous was the power of this fake metaphysics and oppressive meta-ideology. To 
question it was akin to a taboo because it would mean questioning the role of the emperor, 
Japan’s cultural identity as well as the power structure hidden behind this ideology. People 
were unable to oppose extreme politics, which was denying any sense of humanity in the 
name of a transcendental mission. To be deprived of a discourse to express one’s opposition 
is one of the worst kinds of totalitarianism. To voice opposition in this situation would be 
holding the discourse of the enemy, being dismissed and even annihilated. It was thus a silent 
subjective repression, a conceptual cage and a tunnel toward total disaster. This unreal 
situation explains why, immediately after the war, Japanese people seemed to foreign 
observers to wake up from a nightmare and just restart their lives in their devastated cities 
(Dower 1999: 97-110). They were invaded by their enemy and felt liberated at the same time. 
 
The problem is: what were these intellectuals really doing during this 1942 
“overcoming modernity” colloquium? To start with, they collected the broken pieces of 
Japan’s modern history and reconnected them in a new collective memory in accordance with 
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their pseudo-unity and the role these intellectuals thought they were entitled to play against 
the backdrop of frustration during Japan’s initial modernization. More precisely, they were 
managing memory in order to better control the people. Reading the proceedings makes  one 
thing perfectly clear: no real debate took place. They had different but not opposing opinions. 
These opinions were strengthening and justifying each other’s stance. The colloquium was a 
collective construction of a diagnosis of Japan’s historical situation, the tentative construction 
of an intellectual consensus on the meaning of the war, of a national pact in order to build 
trust and support for the government’s war policy. These intellectuals positioned themselves 
as the prime movers of the nation’s unity, their converging opinions serving to fuse together 
the spirit of Japan and the will of the Japanese people. Tenkō was their method but their goal 
was to stop endless tenkō by enunciating a truth. They were fabricating a fake memory with 
the goal of excluding any real debate and any real knowledge of Japan’s modernization and 
present situation. The colloquium was in fact no more than  a discussion driven by a political 
agenda based on reciprocal interests. Their interpretation of Japan’s situation could in no way 
act as a substitute for the effective experience and memory of the Japanese people, for the 
ideals, achievements and failures of Meiji, for the economic and social crisis of the 1920s, for 
the repressions, exploitations and the wars, including this last one Japan could not win.  
These intellectuals were working together to fabricate metaphysics by assembling a set 
of “language games”, pieces of memory and arguments, cohered into a scenario, a montage of 
past events and an interpretation of the present.  Their efforts were in negotiating the 
construction of a metaphysical scenario, which had as its goal repression in a Freudian sense: 
that is, to conceal from the Japanese people the effective reasons for their present situation. 
This meta-ideology covers up its construction: it was an obstacle to knowledge, a fake 
memory and a false history of Japan’s modernization. The metaphysics of “overcoming 
modernity” deserves all our attention  because it points at a specific moment in the evolution 
of a society. This moment of deep crisis, touching all aspects of society, is simultaneously a 
moment when the reasons for the crisis are suppressed, the investigation hindered and a 
metaphysical substitute invented. A history of Japan’s evolution is made impossible, reduced 
to a narrative acting as common memory. What is perverse in the case of Japan is that this 
metaphysics planted this false collective memory inside individual subjectivities. No society 
seems to be immune to this situation29. The construction of this metaphysics needs to be 
                                                
29 The case of France in the 1930s is both similar and simultaneous: French fascism intended to overcome the 
opposition between left and right by invoking the “spirit” of the French nation, its unique history and culture. 
This spirit is a call for morality and ethics against the “modern world” (Sternhell 2012: 789, 295-317, 382-407). 
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studied in order to understand the historical and contemporary power of this interpretive 
frame, a source of many different ideologies and philosophies. Its apparent depth needs to be 
examined in order to prove its banality: it is an endless story, a myth and its endless 
variations30. Some extended variations might sound deep and full of sense. This explains why 
“overcoming modernity” is still everywhere in our discourses and daily experience. What is 
“infamous” in this metaphysics-as-collective memory is that it pretends to be a philosophy 
when the meaning and role of philosophy are, on the contrary, to criticize such metaphysical 
or ideological constructions because they produce ignorance instead of knowledge. 
Exposing the mode of construction and role of this fallacy is necessary. Reading the 
proceedings reveals how these intellectuals were not discussing directly Japan itself and its 
history. The discussions were constantly mediated by European long-term and contemporary 
history. Japan was debated in the mirror of an interpretation of Europe’s modern evolution. 
What the audience and the readers were supposed to see was not the mirror held up to them 
but an image of Japan in the mirror of European modernity, of an interpretation of modernity 
in Europe. The colloquium built up Europe as a substitute for Japan. The cover-up sent a tacit 
message to the readers: “Consider what is happening in Europe, understand how Europe 
ended up in its present situation and you will understand  the direction Japan is heading if you 
do not undertake everything possible to overcome foreign modernity by supporting the 
Japanese government”. It is nothing more than propaganda under the guise of metaphysics.  
Debating about Europe enabled the participants to avoid and repress any real debate 
about Japan’s situation. The false mirror of Europe had the goal of injecting into the minds of 
the people one simple idea: if the people fail to support the government’s war policy, they 
will repeat Europe’s evolution and descend  into spiritual, cultural and social self-destruction. 
Europe is built up as a false mirror of Japan’s modern past, present and future, as a model to 
fear and reject in order to tacitly edify and justify a pure Japanese model. This discursive 
dispositive dissimulates the real situation of Japan and the effective condition of the Japanese 
people. This is commonly done today when the “West” or “modernity” are criticized by 
China, Russia or is rejected around the world on ethnic or religious grounds. The dispositive 
is always the same: Europe was constructed as a distorted vision of a true Japan but the 
construction of this distortion was covering up the truth of Japan. This perverse dispositive 
                                                                                                                                                   
Beyond historical fascism, this syndrome is still pervasive and influential in France. Advanced industrial 
societies find themselves in a similar situation since 2007. The fact that the circumstances, the causes and 
consequences are obviously different, dissimulate the similarities. Investigations are not suppressed but are not 
heard and taken into account. 
30 One of these variations is found in Heidegger post-war essay “The question concerning technology” (1953).   
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shows both the status of these intellectuals and the role they intended to play at this historical 
context. The same dispositive offered them after the defeat the possibility of an easy tenkô. 
They just had to reverse the mirror: Europe could become again the model to reproduce and 
former Japan the model to reject. It was just a question of memory management. 
  
4. “Overcoming modernity”: the script 
 
Despite their historical roots in 1940’s Japan, exposing the basic script produced 
through these texts and discussions is necessary and even urgent. As explained before, this 
metaphysics is a composite narrative made of fragments of memories, histories and 
experiences, philosophies and ideologies, beliefs from Japan and Europe. The script, i.e. the 
argumentative structure of many different narratives needs to be analysed with some 
precision. First, the narrative of “overcoming modernization” acts as a collective memory 
inside individual subjectivities. It formulates what people are supposed to feel and understand 
about their nation and their personal responsibility toward the nation. Secondly, it provides 
fake explanations of the causes and potential consequences of their situation. It pretends to be 
a cure for their anxiety but the goal is on the contrary to intensify anxiety. Thirdly, people are 
supposed to assimilate this metaphysics as their own memory and as the common experience 
of the people of Japan. This memory is simply the subjective internalization of a metaphysical 
discourse, the production of a trans-individual unconscious acting as a collective belief. In 
other words, to formulate the script of this discourse opens the possibility to analyse the 
structure of this experience and memory. 
 
The core of the script is a thesis about modernity, source of endless variations in 
academic research and mass media everywhere in this world. Just look around and you will 
find many different variations. According to this script, the origin of modernity is a 
catastrophe: a divide within society and between societies (Calichman 2008)31. This divide is 
supposed to have erupted for the first time in world history in Western Europe: it is 
considered as the essence or origin of modern Europe and the West, a historical scandal and 
the source of all modern (contemporary) problems32. The consequence of this eruption is a 
                                                
31 These arguments are mainly developed during the colloquium by Kamei Katsuichiro (1907-1966), Nishitani 
Keiji (1900-1990), Yoshimitsu Yoshihiko (1904-1945). The year of their death shows that some of them were 
influential until recently.  
32 This scenario is particularly virulent these days in radical Islam but also in religious fundamentalisms and 
many regressive popular philosophies. 
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divide between two types of civilization, which have nothing in common. A first type of 
civilization is centred around religion, around a transcendental faith or metaphysical principle 
establishing and guaranteeing (by force if necessary) unity, harmony and coherence between 
the different components of society: harmony between humanity and nature, between humans, 
between cultures and nations. A second type of civilization is modern, European, Western or 
Westernized. In contrast to the first one, it has lost its transcendental principle of unity, 
harmony and coherence. It is supposed to drift without god and religion: nothing exists 
anymore beyond humans and humanity to block and control, regulate and tame conflicts. Men 
and women are responsible and in charge of everything: because of their limited knowledge, 
they repeatedly fail. Morality has disappeared and humans are caught in endless conflicts and 
wars due to selfishness, jealousy and competition. There are no limits to human will and no 
sacred norms to follow and respect: everything is temporary and relative, discussed and 
negotiated, debated and contested. A society, which has lost its God, is supposed to fall into 
the modern spirit of capitalism and democracy.  
Thousands of intellectuals and philosophers around the world have repeated and still 
explore this script. This modern divide revolves around the “Copernican revolution” and the 
invention of “modern science”33. The very existence of this modern divide is a cultural and 
religious taboo: how was it even possible? The divide is both a fact and impossible at the 
same time. So there must be a hidden continuity between a Middle Age and a Modern age, 
between a world closed around a transcendent being and a world centred around Man, open 
and in constant transformation, in which individuals and groups debate and organize their 
world according to their own principles, interests and values. More profoundly, if such a 
modern world is possible and even successful, it must be because the former transcendental 
world made it possible and even led to its formation and growth34 . There must be an 
“invisible hand”, not just a “spontaneous emerging order”. The transcendental ground is just 
ignored and denied but will prevail in the end. For the intellectuals debating in 1942 about 
“Overcoming modernity”, Japan’s culture was supposed to be the living proof of its trans-
historical existence.  
If in Europe, the modern divide concerns the conception of the Christian God and the 
role of religion, in the case of Japan, it concerned the meaning and role of the emperor, a 
conception of society as a community organized by a divine principle effectively present 
                                                
33 The historical meaning of the Copernican revolution was debated in remarkable contributions by Shimomura 
Toratarô (1902-1995), a historian of modern science, and Tsumura Hideo (1907-1985), a film critic. 
34 The continuity between the ancient world, the Middle Age and the modern age is still a debate in the French 
contemporary philosophy concerned by Christianity and other religious presuppositions.  
  
21 
within this world, amongst its subjects. It concerned also the restoration of the emperor as 
condition, source and spiritual guide of the modernization of the nation. The tennō was living 
proof that modernity is not a divide: another modernity is possible, which does not separate a 
modern society from its sacred and ancient roots. More generally, the historical disorders, 
crises and wars of Europe and the West are supposed to bring proof that modernity puts 
humanity at risk and leads to its self-destruction. Of course the taboo facing these 
intellectuals, these modernizers, is that Japan was at war at the time of the colloquium. It was 
urgent in 1942 to justify and find an explanation for the war in which the Japanese nation, its 
emperor and its people were engulfed. Modernizers took it as their personal responsibility to 
explain that Japanese modernity was not the “big divide” but on the contrary a restoration, a 
return to Japan’s origin in order to ground continuity between the sacred and the modern 
world. These intellectuals were operating in this colloquium their own tenkō by explaining the 
need to “overcome modernity”, to deny the modern divide, to suppress the dividing seeds of 
modernization. They also intended, explicitly or not, to overcome the divide between the 
modernizers in power, who were governing society and managing the war and the literary 
modernizers, who were debating in the name of the Japanese people in order to infamously 
operate a further tenkō and bring proof of their ideological support to the war. “Overcoming” 
is not Hegelian Aufhebung but Freudian suppression.  
Beyond the articles and discussions at the colloquium, the message is clear: Japan was 
forced to go to war in order to prevent the modern divide from further damaging the Japanese 
nation, to sew up the nation around its emperor, to fight and resist the enemy, i.e. all those 
modernized and profane nations, which have for their only principle the modern divide, i.e. 
the absence of principle. The tacit strategy shared by all participants was to suppress Japan’s 
real history and memory of the Japanese people: the final failure of the Edo period, the 
conditions of the Meiji restoration, the construction of a modern state and economy, the 
debate about the Rights of the people, the economic exploitation of the masses (especially 
women), the construction of a modern army and conflicts with neighbouring countries, the 
political repression, the financial and economic crisis of the 1920s, the attempted military 
coups, the war in China and now the Pacific war. The goal of the “overcoming modernity” 
metaphysics was to neutralize history and suspend historical knowledge, the right of 
individuals to access their common history. This suppression was substituting European 
modern history for Japan’s modernization and was reducing Europe to its multiple 
revolutions, crises and wars, including the self-destruction of European modern ideals in 
World War I. This suppression and substitution were operated through the mutual 
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construction of a metaphysical explanation: the end of the medieval supposedly sacred world 
and the emergence of a secular world based on jealousy, greed, competition, an unbound will 
to control nature and humanity. Individual rights, civil freedom and democracy, economic 
growth, scientific knowledge, including the transition from religion to faith, the very content 
of secular European civilization were suppressed exactly as  Japanese historical memory was 
suppressed. The Japanese were trapped in a metaphysical cage and total war. 
 
5. Conclusion. From inter-subjective memory to history as human science 
 
When did it stop? Or, did it stop at all? These are challenging questions not only for 
understanding present-day Japan but also for understanding all these societies caught in 
variations of the syndrome of overcoming modernity. Is it possible to free Japan, Russia or 
China, even France and the USA, among many others, from the suspicion of recurring hard or 
soft ultra-nationalism? In the case of Japan, the period oscillating between repeated 
modernizations and the desire to overcome modernity is now closed. Japan is post-modern: 
“after the modern” is also beyond “overcoming modernity”. That is, a Japanese version of 
modernity is firmly in place. This does not prevent Japan, like any other nation, from having 
fits of patriotism, chauvinism, populism and nationalism. The trauma of the war is so deep 
and devastating that part of it is both acknowledged and denied at the same time, taboo35. We 
are all aware of the right-wing black sound trucks in front of train stations and their rhetoric. 
But the ideological construction at the source of ultra-nationalism, as analysed above, has 
vanished. The individual and collective memory of the contemporary Japanese is precisely the 
disappearance of this ideology. Even visits by Prime ministers to the Yazukuni shrine look 
like staged events for TV cameras, an embarrassing political folklore, more than the revival of 
ultra-nationalism. History as human science cannot be overcome anymore by individual and 
collective phantasms. On the contrary, human and social sciences act in Japan like in Europe 
as the twin supports of memory. Japanese society is facing today other problems. 
But the fight was intense and never ends. In 1949, a famous participant in the 1942 
colloquium, Nishitani Keiji, gave a course on nihilism at Kyoto University. The translators 
(Parkes & Aihara 1990) of the resulting book found the perfect title to condense its contents, 
                                                
35 Japanese politics and medias remain infested by debates on history manuals, chapters on comfort women, war 
crimes, medical experiments on populations, mass murders, which no Japanese can deny but which deeply 
question Japan’s historical identity. Facing their war crimes and to overcome this tragic moment of their history, 
the Germans could refer to Humanism, the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Because the Japanese cannot find 
anymore in their history a similar solution, they found article 9 of the 1947 Constitution and the ideals of post-
war democracy. Japan is still at work with itself. 
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The self-overcoming of nihilism36. The goal of the course was to restart and rewrite the 1942 
Tokyo colloquium on “overcoming modernity”. Nishitani did not intend to correct or justify 
what he wrote in 1942 but to express in 1949 the meaning of his thought. The defeat, the 
destructions and the dead, the invasion and occupation by the enemy are explained like 
Nishida Kitaro had foreseen in 1944: they correct deep philosophical mistakes. The cause is 
European thought and the importation of the virus of modernity all through Japan’s 
modernization. The virus is nihilism. The question in 1949 is: should the Japanese renounce 
“overcoming modernity”? Has it become impossible? But if it is impossible, what is the 
meaning of this despairing nihilism? Nishitani’s answer was to accept and deepen nihilism, 
not to deny or reject it. The experience of nihilism is considered the only way to rediscover 
and restore the spirit, the trans-historical essence of Japan, to further purify this spirit and 
deepen the unique Japanese experience of being. He intended to prove the superiority of the 
Japanese spirit by a distinction between nihilism and nihility. Nihilism is the effect on 
European civilization of the despairing experience of God being dead and a life without 
meaning. Nihility is the experience that God never existed: the idea of God dissimulates the 
reality of life. So what was, concretely, Nishitani’s answer? Simple: that the Japanese should 
not fear Americanization and Westernization in general as it is meaningless to oppose 
nihilism. The solution is thus to accept it and even want it in order to push it to its limit. 
Americanism is a type of civilization, which is a non-civilization, the death and negation of 
any spirit, the triumph of entertainment, greed and violence. But there will be a moment when 
nihilism will become an end in itself and prove a dead-end. This moment is supposed to be 
the experience of what nihility means. Endless consumption and entertainment, the two 
principles of Americanism, lead to nihility. Seeing shopping in Japan and the rest of East 
Asia, the road to nihility seems a long one without end. Clearly, Nishitani did not learn much 
from the war. 
 
During the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s, the Humanities and social sciences 
took a final hold on collective memory. Another generation of intellectuals who set out to 
write the history of modern Japan sought to concentrate first on the 1930s and 1940s. 
Takeuchi Yoshimi wrote a major article on the “Overcoming modernity” colloquium 37 , 
Tsurumi Shunsuke edited from 1959 to 1962 a three volumes series Recantation: a 
                                                
36 For a detailed analysis, see Rieu 2001, 2013: chapter 5. 
37 “Overcoming modernity” in Calichman (2004), chapter 5. My comments are derived from the colloquium 
itself. 
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collaborative research project (revised edition in 1978. See Olson 1992: 133-135) focusing 
on the tenkō process, from the invasion of Manchuria until the American occupation. 
Maruyama Masao undertook archaeology39 of democracy in Japan. What is remarkable is the 
explicit goal of replacing pre-war and war memories by historical and sociological research, 
to replace ignorance by knowledge, to publish the results of a thorough inquiry with the goal 
of establishing an inquiry as the basis of public debate. Yoshimoto Takaaki (1964) is another 
author, who constantly studied ultra-nationalist ideology and the reasons why Japanese 
culture and institutions gave rise and fell pray to this ideology. 
A growing distance was established between the Japan of the first half of the twentieth  
century and the Japanese economy and society rebuilt since 1945. When in the early 1980s, 
the Japanese economy was the most productive and innovative in the world, the pride of the 
Japanese, the nihonjinron movement, appeared as a sort of secularized and popular 
nationalism, a sort of excessive patriotism, which was never a real danger for democracy. The 
period when Japan was “the best” and “unique” was short-lived: in 1985, the first endaka (rise 
of the yen) started the deconstruction of the Japanese economy and it opened the gate of the 
systemic crisis, which started in the early 1990s and has since deeply transformed Japan.  
In this context, the volume Postmodernism and Japan (1989) edited by Harry 
Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi played an important role in establishing a connection 
between the project to “overcome modernity” and the post-modern movement. The 1942 
colloquium was indeed studied in the book but the connection between the two was proved 
misleading. The book taught the world what post-modernism meant in Japan, touching all the 
problems raised by modernity in Japan and also elsewhere. Japanese studies were not any 
more confined to the study of Japan but were considered as a major field of study in human 
and social sciences (at least for this author). If asked to give a date when the spell of the 
“overcoming modernity” ideology vanished, I would venture 1996 and a colloquium The 
modern after the postmodern organized by Henri Meschonnic and Hasumi Shiguehiko at 
Tokyo University (2002). The idea that after postmodernism, a new conception of the modern 
and a new modernity were starting or could be imagined, proved that the memory of the 1942 
colloquium and the phantasm of  “overcoming modernity” belonged in Japan to the past. The 
challenge is enormous.  
But the “overcoming modernity” phantasm is alive and well in many parts of the 
world. Hopefully the case of Japan can help identify this syndrome and teach how to cure this 
                                                
39 In the sense of Michel Foucault: an analysis of the historical conditions of democratic culture and institutions. 
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dangerous social disease. Memory is endlessly contested and contestable because it has no 
ground, just inter-subjective agreements, which are expressing the power of a group or a 
nation on others. The case of Japan makes clear what history as a human science means in the 
evolution of societies toward modernity. Endless research, debates and controversies are its 
strength: they produce new knowledge. As a discipline, history is an essential part of public 
debate and democracy: it criticizes and regulates collective memory and its impact on 
individual subjectivities and behaviours. Interferences between history and memory are a 
constant tension. To contest the freedom of historians or to reduce the role of history and 
human sciences in public debates is to increase the risk of repeating endless memory conflicts 
and even regressing to immemorial wars. Finally this study intends to bring proof that in 
order to play their critical role in a democratic society, human sciences need to integrate a 
trans-cultural and trans-disciplinary perspective.    
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